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Article 4

Why, and How, Judges Should Study Poetry
William T. Braithwaite*
FOREWORD

These observations were originally presented as a lecture at the
final session of the Illinois Judicial Conference's seminar "Ethical
Issues in Law and Society," May 28-30, 1987, in Galena, Illinois.
Some revisions have been made for publication, and footnotes
added.
The Galena seminar, with some changes in the content of the
program (but not in its character), was repeated in Urbana, Illinois
October 8-10. Eighty-nine trial and appellate judges attended the
two offerings of the seminar. The program was very popular with
participants; over ninety-eight percent of the written evaluations
were positive, and almost no judges gave either offering a negative
overall evaluation. Virtually one hundred percent of the judges
submitting evaluations at both locations answered "yes" to the
questions whether they would attend another similar program and
would recommend it to other judges.
The "Ethical Issues" seminar was the Judicial Conference's first
law-and-literature program. Besides being new, it was also, by
comparison with previous Conference seminars, unconventional in
both form and content. Its content was literature, not cases and
statutes; its form, small-group discussions (seminars), not lectures
(save the one published here and a different one presented at Urbana, which will be published separately).
The first such program for judges, during the past decade, probably was that for Massachusetts district court judges in 1981, organized by Brandeis University's Legal Studies Program, Professor
Saul Touster, Director. I According to Professor Touster, the
Brandeis Program has organized or helped to organize such programs for judges in fifteen states. The National Judicial College in
Reno, Nevada has had such a program annually since 1985.
The proposal for the Illinois program originated with Judge
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law; B.A.,
1961, Virginia Military Institute; J.D., 1964, Washington and Lee University.
1. See Touster, Parables for Judges, 27 BOSTON B.J. 4 (1983); Touster, Parablesfor
the Professions, 5 BRANDEIS REv. 2 (Winter 1986).
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Kenneth Gillis of the Circuit Court of Cook County, a member of
the faculty of the National Judicial College, and Professor Marc
Kadish of IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. The Judicial Conference's Executive Committee recommended the proposal favorably
to the supreme court in October 1986, and the court promptly approved, authorizing the Galena seminar to be held the following
May.
The principal aim of the program was to provide participants an
opportunity to reflect on the process of judging and on what it
means to be a judge. The literary works used were an ancient
Greek tragedy, Sophocles's Anaigone; a short nineteenth-century
novel, Herman Melville's Billy Budd, Sailor; and two twentiethcentury short stories, Susan Glaspell's "A Jury of Her Peers" and
George Orwell's "Shooting an Elephant."
The small-group seminars were the core of the program. At
each location, a team of two seminar leaders was responsible for
one work (or the two short stories together). Participants were divided into three groups, and the groups rotated among the three
teams of instructors. Over half the participants named the seminars as the most interesting part of the program.
At both locations, there were also evening and Saturday morning sessions. At Galena, the movie "A Man for All Seasons" was
shown Thursday evening, a staged reading of the trial scene from
Shakespeare's "The Merchant of Venice" was presented Friday
evening (followed by discussion), and the lecture following this
Foreword was given Saturday morning. At Urbana, the movie
"Rashomon" was shown Thursday evening, an optional seminar
on Guy de Maupassant's short story "The Assassin" was held Friday evening, and the Saturday morning session was an oral argument competition based upon a fictional domestic murder case
using the literary works as legal "authorities." In addition, a lecture, "Argument in Literature," was given at the opening lunch in
Urbana.
I.
Merely to describe what we have been doing reminds us how
radical it must seem to be, how unconventional it surely is: sixty
judges and a couple of law professors meet for two days to read
literature and to ask what questions it raises about "Ethical Issues
in Law and Society." Today's closing session gives us the opportunity to think together about the meaning of what we have been
doing.
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For the typical Judicial Conference seminar, the materials are
historical-cases and statutes. The method of instruction is the
lecture. The aim is to convey information and some knowledge of
what the information means. The program is purposefully practical. The judges who come do so because they want to learn something that will be directly useful in their work.
All of us know the present seminar is not typical. It is so far
from typical that its every element is unconventional-materials,
method of instruction, aim, character, and the motives of the participants. Our materials are not historical but literary. The
method of instruction is not lecture but questioning and disciplined
conversation. The aim is not to convey information but to raise
and examine fundamental questions-questions that, if properly
stated, can be seen as not likely to have clear-cut or definitive answers. The program is purposefully thoughtful rather than practical: it emphasizes thinking rather than doing, deliberation rather
than deciding. And while the faculty hope very much, and believe,
that the program will have a salutary effect on those who take part,
we assume that most of the participants are not moved primarily
by the expectation of acquiring something directly useful in their
everyday work.
Of course, there is no bright line separating deliberation from
decision. Thinking about how a case should be decided moves ineluctably and by vegetable gradations into the actual decision of it.
All judges know from experience of this integral relation between
thinking about what should be decided and deciding what they
have been thinking about. A judge who decides without thinking,
without deliberating (for whatever length of time the circumstances permit, and that sometimes is not very much), avoids injustice only by chance, unless he happens to have formed the kinds of
habits of thought which help move him, under pressure, toward
right action.
Is there not a proper place in judicial education for studying the
very process of deliberating and deciding questions of right and
wrong, that is, of ethics? The study of substantive law there surely
must be, of principles, rules, and particular decisions of higher
courts, but why not also the study, at once theoretical and practical, of how and why judges deliberate and decide the way they do?
This is the Illinois Judicial Conference's first venture into this
more philosophical kind of judicial education. It is therefore a
duty to our profession as well as an obligation to our supreme
court, the Judicial Conference, the Conference's Executive Com-
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mittee, and the Sub-committee on Judicial Education, that we take
time this morning to ask what, really, have we been doing at this
seminar? and why should judges do it? and what good is it?
II.
Most of us would call the readings for this seminar "literature."
"Literature" can mean anything written in books, however, including appellate court opinions and statutes, neither of which we ordinarily call "literature." To call what we have been reading
"poetry" would be more precise, even though to do so runs across
the grain of the popular notion that "poetry" means verse that
rhymes. Notwithstanding this popular notion, the root sense of
this word does not signify rhyming verse, but simply something
made. The word "poetry" comes from a Greek verb that means
"to make." Thus any literary work that is made can properly be
called poetry, even though it may not appear in the form of rhyming verse. In this sense, "poetry" means (to put it colloquially)
made-up, invented out of the artist's imagination. This is the sense
in which I am using the word on this occasion.
Some works that appear to be made, made-up, invented out of
the artist's imagination, are not so in fact. The difference between
a literary work that is truly made and one that is not, can be seen
by a careful comparison of Sophocles's Antigone with George
Orwell's "Shooting an Elephant."
None of the events in Antigone actually happened to the characters in the play. It is commonly said that Sophocles drew upon a
myth, or legend, or folk-tale, in writing his play. However that
may be, we in fact have no text or manuscript, other than that of
the play itself, telling this myth in the richness of detail we find in
Antigone. For all practical purposes, the play is not only the best
evidence, but also the only evidence, of the myth. Thus the characters themselves, as they appear in the play, are creatures of the
artist's imagination. Since the events, the characters, and their
words and deeds all come from artistic imagination rather than
from real-life, the whole work is, strictly speaking, a made thing.
Orwell's story, on the other hand, is the first-hand account of a
real event that actually happened to the writer. It is essentially
autobiography. To the extent it could be said to have what some
might call a "literary" aspect, that aspect comes from the writer's
report, as the story unfolds, of what he thought and felt. Some
book reviewers and literary people today call this kind of story
"psycho-history" or "psycho-biography."
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Such a story can be written in either the first or the third-person.
Orwell's story is in the first-person. He tells us: I did this and that,
and then something else happened to me, and this is what I was
thinking and feeling at the time. A story told from this perspective
characteristically gives as much emphasis to what was going on in
the actor's mind as to what he said and did. In Antigone, by contrast, the characters never tell us directly what they are thinking
and feeling; rather, we must infer their thoughts and passions from
their words and deeds.
Orwell's story contains, essentially, only one deed of any consequence, and that is the shooting of the elephant. There is almost
no conversation. Does the almost complete absence of conversation provide a clue to the writer's capacity truly to understand what his senseless act signifies about his character? However
this may be, and regardless whether we call "Shooting an Elephant" history or autobiography (with or without the prefatory
"psycho-"), the thing we need to notice for present purposes is that
it reports a real event. As a report of a real event, it is not different
in principle from a book about the Battle of Gettysburg or the
statement of facts in Suvada v. White Motor Company.2 The events
in all three accounts are inimitably particular, forever fixed in time,
place, and circumstances.
The events in Antigone, on the other hand, being a product of
Sophocles's imagination, did not happen at a definite and identifiable time in the past. In some sense, they happen anew each time
we read the play. What Antigone and Creon say and do is always,
for the reader, taking place in the present-a present that will always be present, as long as there are readers of the play, an eternal
present. At line 609 the Chorus speaks of Zeus, the king of the
gods, as "Unaged in time."' 3 Antigone was first produced, as far as
scholars can tell, over 2,400 years ago. Is not the play itself, like
Zeus, also "unaged in time," outside time, therefore time-less?
The place and time of the action in Orwell's story are Burma
and the British colonial occupation early in the twentieth century.
Are not the specific time, place, and circumstances essential to how
we understand this story? The writer's preoccupation with the
2.

32 Ill.
2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).

3. References to line numbers in the play are to the edition used at the Judicial Conference seminar-Elizabeth Wyckoff (trans.), Antigone, The Complete Greek Tragedies
(David Grene and Richard Lattimore, eds., The University of Chicago Press, 1954). Ref-

erences to the formal parts of the play (prologue, scenes, odes, etc.) are to the edition in
Dudley Fitts & Robert Fitzgerald, Sophocles." The Oedipus Cycle (San Diego: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1977).
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moral ambiguities of British colonial rule, and of his place in the
regime that enforces that rule, makes it difficult for the reader to
imagine these events taking place in other times or places or in
somewhat different circumstances. True, empires have always had
colonies. The empire of ancient Athens, which was at its glorious

height just at the time Antigone was first produced, had colonies
scattered throughout the eastern Mediterranean. Orwell's emphasis, however, is not so much on the nature and problems of empire
as such, at whatever time and place (though he does hint at these
subjects), as on the nature and problems of the British empire in
particular. He tells the story in such a way that the events in it
really make sense only in the specific setting in which they actually
occurred. The story is bound to its time and place.
The place of the action in Antigone is Thebes, a city in Greece.
Is this locale critical to our understanding of what happens in the
play? Is it hard to imagine such events taking place in, say, Rome,
Cairo, or even London? Have not men always and everywhere
known that beliefs and opinions about death, burial, treason, and
the role of the gods in human affairs touch upon deep and sometimes terrible passions?
Nor are such opinions and passions limited to the ancient world.
They are as close to us today as Lebanon and Northern Ireland.
Consider the report in an American newspaper in April, 1979 that
an Iranian mob tried to prevent the burial in Tehran's Moslem
cemetery of Amir Abbas Hoveida, Prime Minister under the Shah
for thirteen years, who was arrested when the Shah fell and was
later executed for treason.4 Hours after his execution, according to
the report, his body lay unclaimed in a Tehran morgue. The report
did not say whether any family member had asked for it.
Such a report reminds us that the principal themes of Sophocles's play touch upon problems in human life which are not unfamiliar to us here and now. The comprehensiveness of Sophocles's
view of human life is indicated by the range and diversity of subjects he not only touches upon but thoughtfully explores.
The Chorus's fourth speech (Ode III) deals with love, Antigone's final speeches in scene 4 with marriage. The family-relations between husband and wife, parents and children, brother and
sister-is a theme throughout, as is the more general topic of the
political character of relations between men and women. "No woman rules me while I live," Creon says at line 526. "We must
4. Chicago Sun-Times, Apr. 9, 1979, at 2, cols. 1-3.
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remember," Ismene cautions Antigone at line 61, "that we two are
women so not to fight with men." The man who believes there is
nothing in which he should be ruled by a woman and the woman
who believes she must always submit to men are timeless and universal human types. At this seminar we met them again in an isolated rural Iowa farmhouse, in Susan Glaspell's 1918 story "A
Jury of Her Peers." Some of you have observed to me during this
seminar that you daily see varieties of these human types in your
courtrooms, and not only in divorce and custody cases.
Law, its source and nature, is another principal theme of Antigone. Creon is the archetypal spokesman for positive law, the view
that law is the will of the legislator. "Is the town to tell me how I
ought to rule?. . . Am I to rule by other mind than mine?...
custom gives possession to the ruler," he tells his son Haemon, to
which Haemon replies, "You'd rule a desert beautifully alone."
Antigone is the archetypal spokesman for higher law, the view that
the law made by men, whether in Washington, Springfield, or the
City Council in Galena, must be subject to a law above man's law,
and Antigone seems to believe that that law is divine in character.
"Nor did I think your orders were so strong," she says to Creon,
"that you, a mortal man, could over-run the gods' unwritten and
unfailing laws. Not now, nor yesterday's, they always live, and no
one knows their origin in time."
Antigone's reminder to Creon of his mortality points to another
of the play's major themes-how human life should be lived in
light of the inevitability of death. In Ode I, the Chorus comments
on man's unique place in the order of the world, his capacity to
cross the sea, to wrest a living from the soil, to rule the animals, to
found governments, to conquer nature by providing himself "shelter against the cold, refuge from rain" and contriving cures for "illnesses once beyond all cure." One thing, however, the Chorus
reminds us, man cannot change: "There's only death that he cannot find an escape from."
Mortality is something all of us share, not only with each other
but also with Sophocles, and his play is a sobering reminder of this
fact, however much we may sometimes allow ourselves to be deluded by the charming achievements of modern science into believing that we are somehow closer to knowing what popular writers
like to call "the secret of life." Man's effort to escape death by
conquering nature was known long ago, to Sophocles and to the
human writer who first put on paper the words of the first book of
the Old Testament. Because that effort continues today, we need
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to remember, especially we in the law, that the same mixture of
curiosity, ambition, and pride which gave us birth control, artificial
insemmination, in vitro fertilization, and surrogate mothers (and
all the tangled questions of law these technologies lead to) also
gave us acid rain, Hiroshima, Three Mile Island, and Bhopal. The
ancient story that Teiresias was struck blind when he saw the goddess Athene bathing5 reminds us of the possibility that divine
power may have intended limits to man's curiosity, that perhaps
there are some things we would be better off not knowing. Much
the same point is made by the story related in Genesis of the Temptation and Fall in the Garden of Eden.
Not only law, but also politics and government are themes of
Antigone. In Ode I, the Chorus speaks of man having taught himself "Language, and thought like the wind and the feelings that
make the town" (lines 352-53). What are the feelings that make
the town, according to this play? Is there not a suggestion that
before there can be a "town," that is, a real political community,
there must be some common feeling about the answer to that most
fundamental question in government, namely, who should rule? Is
not the cause of Creon's fate precisely his failure, or inability, to
understand what things are properly subject to his rule and what
things are, in the language of the law, beyond his jurisdiction?
Creon is a ruler, a husband, and a father. He spurns the counsel
both of his subjects, those he seeks to rule, and of his son, whom he
also seeks to rule. He seeks no advice from his wife. In political
life, in marriage, and as a parent, Creon is the archetype of the man
who is blind to the possibility that someone else may be, as to some
things, wiser than himself. His blindness brings him, his family,
and his city to disaster.
We may wish to note, in this connection, that the text of the play
permits the interpretation that the action begins about dawn, with
the Chorus's speech (the parados) celebrating the end of the war
and thanking the gods for the city's deliverance, and the action
ends about dusk, with the Chorus's speech (the paean) a prayer to
the gods for deliverance from the "grim disease" (line 1140) with
which Creon's blindness has infected his city. Thus the play begins
in light and ends in darkness, whereas Creon begins in darkness (he
cannot see what he should see) and ends in light (his blindness is
cured). In a touch of profound irony, Creon's blindness is cured by
a blind man, Teiresias. By the time Creon sees the light, however,
5. See the entry "Tiresias," The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature (Sir Paul
Harvey, ed., Oxford University Press, 1969).
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his life has been enfolded by eternal darkness. Can we imagine
what the silent meditations of his lonely old age will be like, as he
daily remembers what he will daily yearn to forget?
When we look at Antigone this way, we see that its subjects and
the questions it raises are universal and timeless. They are the
problems of the human condition, the problems we have because
we are human. To be human, the play seems to say, means to rule
the animals but to be ruled by the gods; it means having some
power of choice, which animals lack, but perhaps not having fully
decisive power over one's fate, which remains at least partly with
the gods; and it means having a curiosity, of which erotic love is
one form, greed another, ambition yet another, which prompts us
to pursue immortality through the conquest of nature, a pursuit in
which we may, like Teiresias when he saw the goddess Athene
bathing, bring ourselves to see things we would be better off not
seeing.
The Chorus speaks the last speech of the play, and the first sentence of that speech is "Our happiness depends on wisdom all the
way." This suggests that our fate, whether good or ill, does not
depend decisively upon the capriciousness of the gods but rather
upon wisdom, something accessible to human knowing. Creon is
presented as a man who cannot see what he should see. Is Sophocles hinting that human wisdom means knowing the difference between the things we can and should see, if only we use our mind's
eye properly, and the things we perhaps can see but should not?
Consider, in this connection, the prayer that invokes divine help
for strength to change what can be changed, for grace to accept
what cannot be changed, and the wisdom to know the difference.
Self-evidently, a work of literary art, a piece of poetry, made
over two thousand years ago could not speak to us today with the
wonderful intelligibility and relevance of this work unless it somehow captures the essence of what is real and permanent in the
human condition. Here, in comparing Sophocles's play and
Orwell's story, we find an interesting paradox. On first reading,
Orwell's story seems the more real, or realistic, of the two works.
It is like the statement of facts in an unusually interesting case. We
are charmed with its immediacy, its concreteness, its specificity.
Antigone, on the other hand, seems on first reading to be distant,
vague, abstract.
A different picture emerges, however, on a second or third reading. We have already noticed the depths that lie beneath the surface of Sophocles's play. What do we find beneath the surface of
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"Shooting an Elephant"? We find, it seems to me, a somewhat
intelligent man conscientiously concerned about the moral ambiguity of the position in which he finds himself who believes, after the
event is over and he comes to write about it, that he has learned
something about the nature of tyranny. The work itself, however,
does not go much deeper than that. There are in it neither words
nor deeds relating to love, marriage, and the family, nor to the
source and nature of law whether human or divine, nor to the relations between man and the gods, or to the nature of politics and
government, or to most of the other subjects found in Antigone.
We are driven to the conclusion that whatever our first impression of the two works, Antigone, after the careful study we have
given it over the last two days, is the more real of the two. It is
more real because it presents life in all its complexity, variety, passion, blood, splendor, and confusion-life, in a word, as it really is.
From Orwell we learn about the life of a young British colonial
police officer in Burma early in the twentieth century. From Sophocles, however, we learn about all those things in our own lives
which unite us with those who have lived before us and those who
will live after us. We learn about human life as such.
It is, I believe, for these reasons that an ancient Greek thinker
(roughly contemporary with Sophocles) said "poetry is something
more philosophical and of graver import than history." 6 Antigone
is poetry. "Shooting an Elephant" is history. Philosophy means
"love of wisdom." The assertion that poetry is more philosophical
than history, therefore, means that although history, the study of
particulars, may be useful for some, or many, or even most purposes, poetry, the study of universals, of what is true of all men and
women not only here and now but also at all times and everywhere,
will bring us closer to that kind of wisdom the Chorus refers to
when it says "Our happiness depends on wisdom all the way."
That is the first sentence of the closing speech. The last is "So
wisdom comes to the old." The word "So" refers us back to the
preceding sentence, which is, "Great words by men of pride bring
greater blows upon them." This sentence echoes a line from the
Chorus's first speech (theparados): "The boasts of a proud tongue
are for Zeus to hate" (line 128). The apparent sense of the Chorus's closing lines is that pride brings disaster, and it is by this
means that "wisdom comes to the old."
Is this a counsel of hope or a counsel of despair? Is the Chorus
6. Aristotle, Poetics, 1451 b 6-7 (McKeon trans.).
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saying that experience, trial and error, making your own mistakes
and learning from them, is the only way to real wisdom? Or is it
possible to learn from the mistakes of others and thus to avoid
making those same mistakes ourselves?
We cannot, on this occasion, try to give any further answer to
these questions beyond what has emerged from our conversations
over the last two days. We can, however, all take Sophocles's play
away from this seminar, to read again at our leisure and thereby to
nourish our further reflections on these questions. The opportunity to do this suggests an answer to one of the questions in the
title of this lecture. That question is, why should judges study poetry? The answer is that poetry, being universal, permits us to rise
above the particulars of history. It gives us a higher place to stand
as we try to bring into a more intelligible focus our own lives, the
lives of the students who pass through our classrooms on their way
to becoming lawyers, and the lives of the lawyers and clients who
pass through our courtrooms seeking justice. Because poetry permits us to stand on higher ground, it helps us to see farther.
III.
Let us turn now to the other question in the title of this lecture.
How should judges study poetry? The effort to answer this question brings us back to the second of the two fundamental ways in
which this Judicial Conference seminar differs from the conventional kind. The first difference is what we read. We read poetry,
instead of history, Sophocles instead of Supreme Court decisions.
The second difference is what we do with what we read. The
method of instruction at the typical Judicial Conference seminar is
the lecture. This method of instruction assumes, first, that the lecturer knows something the listeners do not know-the latest developments in the law of search and seizure, for example. It assumes,
second, that whatever the lecturer knows can be told to the listeners, and that they can learn from the telling. And it assumes, third,
that the listeners, having come to the lecture to acquire information and knowledge, can by means of the lecture acquire what they
want and take it away with them when they leave.
The method of instruction here, by contrast, has been, with the
sole exception of the present occasion, what would commonly be
called discussion. If we who have led the small-group seminars
have done our jobs properly, you should have left with a feeling
that the discussion was actually a disciplined conversation. The
English noun "conversation" is derived from a Latin verb meaning
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"to turn around," which signifies that in a genuine conversation,
the subject is turned around by and among the participants, so that
it can be seen from all sides. A discussion that has no guide, focus,
or discipline soon degenerates into a mere exchange of opinions,
which, however entertaining for the moment, is not likely to be
very instructive. A discussion that is too highly focused, on the
other hand, often turns out to be a lecture in disguise, an occasion
for the leader to ask questions designed to elicit answers in support
of an argument he has already worked out.
A proper discussion, or seminar, is a mean between these two
extremes. It is the leader's task to guide the conversation, to keep
it on track, so to speak, but not necessarily to decide in advance
where the conversation will go. The aim and destination of the
conversation is left to be worked out as it proceeds. In this way,
the participants, including the leader, learn from one another, and
the leader is himself a participant in the learning process as well as
its guide.
These kinds of disciplined conversations, or seminars, work best,
in my experience, when the leader is himself genuinely curious
about the interpretation and meaning of the text being studied. He
should, of course, be better prepared than those he leads, else he
cannot be truly a leader; but he must also share their curiosity, else
he cannot himself expect truly to learn anything. This expectation
by the seminar leader that he will himself learn something is the
essential difference between the aim of a seminar and the aim of a
lecture. At a lecture, the listeners expect to learn from the lecturer.
In the seminar, the leader expects to learn from the participants. I
have the impression that this expectation has been realized here,
that all of us on the faculty have learned a good deal about the
works we have been reading and studying together with you.
How does all this, one might ask, bear upon the question, how
should judges study poetry? The answer lies in one further observation to be made about the way a seminar works when it is working the way it should. A great teacher of mine put the point this
way. The teacher should always assume, he said, that in the class
there is one silent student who is more intelligent than he is. When
we study the greatest books, the poetry that is a product of the
greatest minds and the greatest imaginations, the assumption just
stated is self-evidently true. In each of the three seminars on Antigone that I have helped lead, there has, indeed, been at least one
silent participant more intelligent than any of us. That silent and
intelligent participant was, of course, Sophocles.

19881

Judges and Poetry

But has he really been silent? Has he not, on the contrary, spoken to each of us, and eloquently, through this immortal and wonderfully-wrought play, a piece of poetry not even 1400 lines long?
Can we not regard our discussions of this work as a kind of continuing conversation with Sophocles, a conversation in which we, as
readers, are prompted by the play to ask it questions, questions to
which the poet, speaking through his play over the space of
twenty-four centuries, gives certain answers?
It might be objected that nothing can be learned from a conversation in which one of the conversants says nothing. That would
not be a correct description of this conversation, however. We
cannot say that Sophocles says nothing unless we are prepared to
say that his play says nothing, for either he speaks to us through
his play or he does not speak to us at all. Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. True, Sophocles does not speak
aloud, but, then, neither does a love-letter, or any letter, for that
matter. Cannot Sophocles's play speak to us in our minds in the
same way a letter does?
Moreover, it is not true that nothing can be learned from a onesided conversation. All of us have had the experience of hearing
one side of a telephone conversation. Were we able to understand
nothing whatever? Or is it not the fact that we could always understand something, though perhaps not all, of what was being said
by the speaker whose voice we could not hear? Perhaps it is relevant here to recall Cromwell's argument at More's trial that sometimes silence can be eloquent in what it betokens.7
These observations are meant to suggest an answer to the question, how should judges study poetry? That answer is, I believe,
judges should study poetry the same way all intelligent men and
women study something serious about which they have a genuine
curiosity-by asking questions, and by remaining open to being instructed by whomever, with regard to the subject at hand, may be
wiser than ourselves, whether that person be a long-dead Greek
poet, a less-long-dead English poet (Shakespeare), or a nineteenthcentury American novelist (Melville). Can we ever be truly open
to learning unless we have a genuine wish to know? Can we have a
genuine wish to know unless we recognize that there may be things
we do not yet truly understand?
7.

The reference is to Robert Bolt's play "A Man for All Seasons," Act II, at 87-88

(New York: Vintage Books, 1962). Seminar participants saw the movie as part of the
program.
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IV.
Our program is entitled "Ethical Issues in Law And Society."
The same ancient Greek writer who asserted that poetry is more
philosophical than history also observed that ethics is a political
rather than a philosophical subject.' To understand what this observation means, we must first ask what he meant by "political."
Our English words "politics" and "political" come from the Greek
word polis, for which the best, though not an entirely precise,
translation is "city." It is sometimes also translated "town" or
"state." The essential sense of polis is "political community,"
which meant, for the Greeks of Sophocles's time, families living
together and sharing common beliefs about the most important
things in human life-love, marriage, family, death, the gods, the
nature of the good, the beautiful, and the true.
For the ancient Greeks, who are credited with having been the
first to discover the art of politics (though they were not of course
the first to practice it), a political community had both a shared
past and the expectation of a shared future. It had both memories
and hopes, because, being based on the family, it looked both backwards, to its elders, forebears, and ancestors, to what was traditional, and also forward, to and through its children and its
children's children. From this perspective, politics, like judging, is
a high and noble art, because it is the art of civic virtue, of making
judgments about the life of the city, always with a view to the common good.
Politics thus understood, as it comes down to us from the ancient Greeks, has, like any art, both a theory and a practice. In
ordinary American-English usage today, we call the theory of politics "political philosophy" or "political science," and this is a subject studied in colleges and universities. We call the practice of
politics simply "politics," and this is a subject learned in elections,
party caucuses, and the legislative chambers of village, town, and
city.
The student of the practice of politics can learn this aspect of the
art the way one of this seminar's faculty did when he entered public life some years ago, running, as a Republican, for a City Council seat during the Daley era in Chicago. He learned from his
defeat, he told his fellow faculty members, his first lesson in Chicago politics. That was: become a Democrat.
The student of the theory of politics, on the other hand, begins
8. Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 2 (McKeon trans.).
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his study of the subject with the first treatise ever written on it, by
Aristotle, titled Politics. It is in this book that Aristotle observes
that ethics is a political rather than a philosophic subject. Politics,
he says, decides which actions are required in a state and which are
forbidden. Politics decides both immediate and transitory questions, such as whether a Republican can win a seat on the Chicago
City Council while Mayor Daley is in office, and also enduring
questions, such as what is the meaning of due process of law.
While politics, according to Aristotle, decides which actions are
required and which are forbidden, ethics decides which actions are
right and which are wrong. Politics, in the form of Creon's edict,
may forbid that Polyneices be buried, but ethics decides whether he
was right or wrong to do so, and the play says quite clearly
(through Teiresias) that he was wrong, although it is not so clear in
saying whether Antigone was right.
In the Venice of Shakespeare's play, politics, operating through
law, decides that contracts shall be enforced, but only ethics can
tell us whether Shylock's insistence on the strict letter of his bargain and Portia's ingenious way of defeating him are right or
wrong.
In the London of Henry VIII, politics, operating through the
Supremacy Act passed by Parliament, called upon all true and
loyal English subjects to take an oath of allegiance to the king as
Supreme Head of the Church in England. We must turn to ethics,
however, to search for an answer to the questions whether this statute and Sir Thomas More's refusal to comply with it were right or
wrong.
These works do permit, indeed encourage, us to wonder whether
the arguments for Henry VIII, Creon, Captain Vere, and Shylock,
are really quite so weak as we may think them, in the first flush of
our admiration for the nobility, virtue, or innocence of their admirable opponents. We, after all, are not asked to be personally responsible for the renewal of civil war which reasonable men in
Henry's time might have believed could occur if Henry had no
male heir. We are not asked to take the risk that the public funeral
of an opposition political leader will lead to a turmoil (as has happened more than once in South Africa) that threatens the possibility of restoring order after a fratricidal civil war. We are not asked,
in consequence of judging Billy Budd by his morally innocent intent rather than his factually guilty act, to risk a mutiny that could
threaten the safety of his ship and even of the fleet of which the
Bellipotent is a part.
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Melville's narrator has a caution for those who might be too
quick, after the fact, to make judgments about the right or wrong
of an action, whether it be the action of the captain of a warship
(Billy Budd, Sailor), a member of a persecuted race and religion
living in an alien city ("The Merchant of Venice"), a morally confused young British police officer in far-off Burma ("Shooting an
Elephant"), -or an isolated Iowa farm-wife ground down by the
wretched loneliness of her condition ("A Jury of Her Peers").
Those who later judge the ethics of judgments made in such circumstances Melville's narrator cautions thus:
Says a writer whom few know, "Forty years after a battle it is
easy for a noncombatant to reason about how it ought to have
been fought. It is another thing personally and under fire to have
to direct the fighting while involved in the obscuring smoke of it.
Much so with respect to other emergencies involving considerations both practical and moral, and when it is imperative
promptly to act. The greater the fog the more it imperii, the
steamer, and speed is put on though at the hazard of running
somebody down. Little ween the snug card players in the cabin
of the responsibilities of the sleepless man on the bridge." 9
When Aristotle says ethics is a political rather than philosophic
subject, I take him to mean something like this. The subject of
philosophy is thought; its activity is intellectual, and its focus is
what men think when they are truly thinking. The subject of politics is action, specifically, civic action-action directed toward the
life of the community. The subject of ethics is the right and wrong
of actions. Even if there is a philosophy of ethics, it is not of much
use to men and women in public life, such as judges. They learn
practical ethics, quite properly, through action-taking actions of
their own (making decisions) and observing the actions of others,
through, for example, reading the newspaper and the advance
sheets.
Of course, taking and observing actions in the world of practical
affairs does suppose that one is always as deliberate as circumstances permit. The time for making a decision is always short, as
every practicing lawyer soon learns. When the complaint or opinion has to be finished by three this afternoon, there is no time for
reading Sophocles or Shakespeare. On the other hand, is it reasonable even to hope to avoid injustice (to say nothing of achieving
justice, which is harder still) unless we sometimes stop and deliber9. Billy Budd, Sailor (An Inside Narrative) 114 (Harrison Hayford and Robert M.
Sealts eds., The University of Chicago Press, 1962). This was the edition used at the
seminar.
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ate about the meaning of what we are doing? Is there any better
catalyst for such deliberation than the long-enduring thoughts of
the greatest minds (preserved in the greatest books) on the most
fundamental things?
V.
I have tried so far in this lecture to answer four questions: In
what ways is this seminar different? What is poetry? How should
poetry be read? And what is ethics?
In what ways is this seminar different? The answer is, what we
have read and the method followed in reading it. What we have
read is poetry.
What is poetry? It is literature invented out of material found in
the imagination of a thinker who is also an artist. Poetry is here to
be understood as distinct from history. A poetic book, being different from an historical book, calls for a different method of reading.
How should poetry be read? The answer is that in reading the
greatest poetry, one should read with great care, a truly open and a
genuinely curious mind, and as if one were having a conversation
with a very intelligent man, a man much wiser than oneself. To
read with great care means to assume the artist knew what he was
doing and had a reason for doing it the way he did, that nothing in
the work is accidental. It means to assume the poem has parts that
together make a whole and that the parts and the whole have an
intelligible relation to one another, in the same way that the parts
of an appellate brief, as prescribed by Supreme Court rule, have an
intelligible relation to one another.
The fourth question was what is ethics? Ethics is ideas of right
and wrong made manifest in specific actions by real men and women, living in a particular time and place, under a particular political regime.
Why should judges study ethics through poetry? Because poetry, which deals with the timeless, the universal, the permanent in
human life, gives us higher ground on which to stand, in comparison with history, which deals with the time-bound, the particular,
the accidental, the transitory. When we stand on higher ground,
we get a longer and better view of the human condition. We can
see farther behind us as well as farther ahead. We can see the present in light of the past and the future in light of both. Judges
should study poetry for the same reason all of us should-because
from it we can learn what it really means to be human.
These observations provide the beginning of an answer to the
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sixth and last question of this lecture, what good is it for judges to
study poetry? The remainder of the answer to this question, we,
your faculty, must now leave you to figure out for yourselves, as
you today return to your homes and chambers to deliberate on
whether the time we have spent together, reading and talking
about poetry, has been well-spent.

